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MIGRATION, IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES

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Summary

The international mobility of people and migration flows are critically influenced by differences in per capita incomes, real wages, job opportunities, institutional capacities and living standards across nations and cities. Its dynamics are shaped by social networks and regulated by the migration policies of receiving countries. International migration represents around 3.3 percent of world's population; up from 2.7 percent in 1995. It is composed, mainly, by of working-age people, with men and women migrants being roughly equal number. Historically, the globalization process of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was also accompanied by large migration flows, mostly, from the "Old World" (Europe) to the "New World" (United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia and other countries in the global south). Starting in the 1980s migration has increased relative to a rise in total population, although the share of international migration to total population was, on average, higher in the first wave of globalization of the 1870-1914 period.

Main substantive topics and new themes in the field of international migration include: (a) the motivations and determinants of the international mobility of the wealthy (High-Net Worth Individuals, HNWIs), a largely unexplored topic in the literature of international migration; (b) the international migration of talent (high-skills, educated and gifted people), (c) the linkages between the mobility of talent and the mobility of capital and their evolution over time affected by macro regimes and international conditions, (d) The relation between macroeconomic and financial crises (e.g the 2008-09 crisis), stagnation traps and immigration flows, (e) the influence of international migration on inequality within and between countries and (f) forced migration, displaced population and humanitarian crises, following war, violence, persecution and human rights violations.

Keywords

International migration, talent mobility, macroeconomic and financial crises, mobility of high-net worth individuals, development gaps, wage gaps, stagnation, inequality, refugees, humanitarian crises.

Introduction and Motivation

The rise of the international mobility of people and migration flows has been a special feature of the globalization process boosted by lower transportation costs, speedy information flows and differences in per capita incomes, real wages, job opportunities and living standards across nations. Migrant networks and immigration policies also play a role in the dynamics of people's mobility across nations.

International migration represents around 3.3 percent of world's population in 2015 up from 2.7 percent in 1995. It is composed, mainly, of working-age people, with the relative importance of men and women migrants being roughly equal. Historically, the globalization process of the late 19^{th} century and early 20^{th} century was also accompanied by large migration flows, mainly, from the "Old World" (Europe) to the "New World" (United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia and other countries in the global south). The current wave of globalization starting in the 1980s has come along also with increased migration but relative to total population although this ratio was higher during the first wave of globalization of the 1870-1914 period. Increased attention has been given to talent migration (highly- skilled people, human capital, gifted individuals) given its impact on knowledge flows, technology transfers, supply of medical services and cultural goods. Another topic is the international mobility of the wealthy, a trend largely neglected by traditional migration theory. On the other end, we have the sharp rise of forced migration, international refugees and internally displaced populations following armed conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and South America (Colombia).

Modern economic and social analysis of migration and empirical data shows that people move from low per capita income nations and modest job possibilities to countries with higher living standards that offer better paid jobs, good quality social services, peace, safety and democratic institutions. Wage gaps and per capita income gaps, certainly, are very important predictors of the direction and size of economic migration flows but these variables have to be complemented also by indicators of human development and institutional capabilities in the receiving country. Forced migration (refugees, displaced populations) reflects the response of people to "failed states" that are unable to maintain internal peace, secure personal protection and the rule of law within their borders. In addition, there seems to be a close relationship between development levels and failed states as most conflict-ridden countries tend to be prevalent in lower and middle-income countries, not in rich, mature capitalist economies.

This chapter provides a selected overview of main themes in the international migration field and highlights new directions of research. It stresses that migration is heterogeneous and composed of a variety of migration types: skilled and unskilled migrants, wealthy individuals and worker's migration, economic migrants versus international refugees and asylum-seekers. Different migration types have their own special motivations and have specific impacts on the host country. In a way, international migration reproduces, at the global level, the degree of internal social stratification, differentiation and social classes that exists at the national level.

It is organized in six sections besides this introduction. Section 2 provides recent trends in international migration at the global level, focusing on patterns of south-north and south-south migration, intra-regional migration and main migration corridors. Section 3 discusses the main determinants of the international mobility of the wealthy (High-Net Worth Individuals, HNWIs), a largely unexplored topic in the literature of international migration. Section 4 turns to the international migration of talent (high skills, educated and gifted individuals), presenting taxonomies of talent mobility and discussing costs and benefits of this type of migration on source countries, in line with traditional concerns on brain drain and human capital flight. Section 5 considers the main links between the mobility of talent and the mobility of capital and section 6 discusses the relation between macroeconomic and financial crises such as the crisis of 2008-09 (and previous ones), stagnation traps and migration flows. Also the chapter explores the influence of international migration on inequality within and between countries. Section 6 turns to the issue of forced migration, displaced population and humanitarian crises, following war, violence, persecution and human rights violations. Section 7 concludes.

Global Trends in Migration

International migration is often defined as people that reside in a country different from the place they were born (stock definition).[i] Migration flows (change in stocks) have been on the rise in the last quarter century as part of the overall process of economic globalization. Between 1990 and 2015 total world migration increased by near 90 million people from 152.6 million individuals to 243.7 million, although the actual number of migrants worldwide could be higher due to the existence of irregular, unrecorded, migration[1]. As of 2015 the developed countries as a whole received 57.7 percent of world migration and the developing countries 42.3 percent[2ii]. At the regional level, the main recipient area is Europe, followed closely by Asia and then North America (NA). The United States is the main recipient country of international migrants and Latin America and Oceania are relatively minor recipient regions of international migrants (see table 1).

Table 1. International Migration Stocks, 1990-2015 (Millions)

	1990	2000	2010	2015
World	152.6	172.7	221.7	243.7
Developed regions	82.4	103.4	132.6	140.5
Developing regions	70.2	69.3	89.2	103.2
Africa	15.7	14.8	16.8	20.6
Asia	48.1	49.3	65.9	75.1
Europe	49.2	56.3	72.4	76.1
Latin America and the Caribbean,	7.2	6.6	8.2	9.2
North America	27.6	40.4	51.2	54.5
Oceania	4.7	5.4	7.1	8.1

Notes: LAC: Latin American Countries, NAM: North America
Source: UN, *International Migration Report,* 2015

As shown in table 2 in the first decade of the 21st century (2010/2000) world migration (stocks) increased at twice the rate of the 1990s (2000/1990): 28.4 percent versus 13.2 percent[3]. In addition, migration to the *developing countries* grew at a higher pace than

[1] UN-DESA (2016).
[2] UN-DESA (2016).
[3] UN-DESA (2016).

migration to developed countries, confirming the momentum of south-south migration. In turn, in the period 2015/2010 this tendency continues, with migration to developing countries growing by near 16 percent while migration in developed countries only increased in 6 percent in that period[4]. This slowdown in migration towards developed countries since 2010 is, probably, related to the slowdown in the rate of GDP growth and employment creation in the United States and Europe since the 2008-09 crisis that reduced the employment possibilities for international migrants.

Table 2. Change in Migration, 2000-2015 (percent)

	2000/1990	2010/2000	2015/2010
World	13.2	28.4	9.9
Developed regions	25.5	28.2	6.0
Developing regions	-1.3	28.7	15.7

Source: UN, International Migration Report, 2015

Direction of International Migration and Regional Patterns

Table 3 presents migration stocks by origin and destination for two group of countries (developed/developing) and six regions of the world (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, LAC; North America, NA, and Oceania) for 2015.

Table 3 Number of International Migrants By Development Group and Major Area Of Destination And Origin, 2015 (Millions, values in parenthesis are percentages)

	Origin

[4] UN-DESA (2016).

Destination	Developed Regions	Developing regions	Africa	Asia	Europe	LAC	NA	Oceania	Other	World
Developed regions	55.2 (81.0)	85.3	12	40.3	50.4	29.7	2.5	1.6	4.1	140.5
Developing regions	13	90.2 (51.4)	20.6	59.5	9.2	6.1	1.9	0.2	5.7	103.2
Africa	1.4	19.2	16.4 (50.3)	1.2	1	0	0.1	0	1.9	20.6
Asia	8.8	66.3	4.1	59.4 (59.5)	6.9	0.4	0.5	0.1	3.6	75.1
Europe	42	34.2	9.2	20.2	39.9 (66.9)	4.6	1	0.4	0.8	76.1
LAC	2.8	6.4	0.1	0.3	1.3	5.9 (16.5)	1.3	0	0.3	9.2
NA	9.2	45.2	2.3	15.5	7.5	24.6	1.2 (27.9)	0.3	3.1	54.5
Oceania	4	4.1	0.5	3	3	0.2	0.2	1.1 (61.1)	0.1	8.1
World	68.2	175.5	32.6	99.8	59.6	35.8	4.3	1.8	9.8	243.7

Source: UN, International Migration Report, 2015

The rise of south-south migration

Regarding the direction of international migration, table 4 shows that as of 2015 south-south migration is greater than south- north migration. In fact, the share of developing country migrants having the “south” (developing countries) as both origin and destination (south-south migration) is 51.4 percent (90.2 million people), while the share of south-north migration is 48.6 percent (85.3 million people) .

In turn, 81 percent of those migrant coming from the north (origin) have the north as destination area (north-north migration). In other words, people born in a developed/high per capita income country is more likely to choose as destination another high-income country because of the superior living standards enjoyed there in comparison with the living standard of a country in the south (these are comparisons based on *average* living standards, inequality of incomes could alter this comparison). Consequently, the percentage of north-south migration is relatively low (19 percent). The terms "south" and "north" are not without some ambiguity, however. Their geographic meaning is straightforward but its economic significance is subtler. For example, a Chinese migrant to Australia would be considered as a south-south migrant from a geographic viewpoint but it would constitute a case of south-north migration from an economic perspective as the migrant would move from a developing country (China) to a developed economy (Australia). In addition, the definition of developing and developed country is not static. 50 years ago countries such as Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and others were considered developing countries while now are considered developed economies because of their increases in per capita income attained since then.

Table 4 International Migrant Stock by Origin and Destination, 2015 (percent)

ORIGIN	**DESTINATION**		
	South	**North**	**Total**
South	51.4%	48.6%	100%
North	19.0%	81.0%	100%

Source: Author's elaboration based on table 3.

The percentage of intra- regional migration (diagonal elements in table 3) is the highest in Europe (66.9 percent) and the lowest in Latin America (16.5 percent) followed by North America with 27.9 percent. In the Americas extra-regional migration is dominant. Intra-regional migration rates over 50 percent are observed in Africa, Asia and Oceania.

Migration Corridors

A considerable part of world migration takes place in some main "corridors" (place of birth-place of residence) across the world that connect countries, often with historical, physical or cultural similarities. Some main *south-south corridors* are tied to oil producing countries as destination (economic-driven corridors). This is the case of the

India-Saudi Arabia corridor and India-United Arab Emirates corridor each with around 2.0- 2.5 million migrants (in country of destination). Other important south-south corridors, that receive similar numbers of foreign migrants are Russia–Kazakhstan, China-Hong Kong, Afghanistan-Iran and Afghanistan- Pakistan. Main *south-north corridors* are Mexico-United States (13 millions), Russia-Ukraine (3.5 millions), Ukraine–Russia (2.9 million), China-United States (2.2 millions), India-United States (2.1 millions), Philippines-United States (1.9 millions), Turkey-Germany (1.5 millions) and Algeria - France (1.5 millions)[iii].

Reflecting the growing importance of south-south migration, in the period 2010-2015 only one corridor, among the top ten corridors entailing the largest number of international migration had a northern destination (Mexico-USA), the other nine corridors have southern destinations. In contrast, in the period 1990-2000, five out of the ten most important world corridors had a country of destination located in the north.

Why People Migrate: Main Determinants of International Migration

There is already a relatively vast literature on the determinants of international migration and its links with development gaps, globalization, the swings and crises in the international economy, labor market conditions in the home and destination countries, the possibilities and restrictions posed by migration policy and other factors, see Borjas, (1999), Solimano, (2010), Goldin, Cameron, Balarajan, (2011),Powel, (2015). Historically-oriented approaches to migration include Hutton and Williamson, (1994), (1998), (2005), O'Rourke and Williamson, (2000). From this research we can identify a list of determinants of migration that involve economic, social and policy variables:

(i) Per capita income, developmental gaps and wage differentials between sending and receiving countries;

(ii) Degree of unemployment and informality in labor markets in the sending and receiving nations;

(iii) Cross country differences in the phase of the economic cycle;

(iv) Family and social networks that share information on job opportunities in the country of immigration;

(v) Migration policies, including incentives and restrictions to the international mobility of people of different skills;

(vi) The cost of migration (distance, cost of traveling, legal costs, search costs);

(vii) Differences in the quality of cities and availability of social services to migrants and their families in receiving countries.

Migration theory (see references above) predicts that economic migrants will generally move from lower per capita income/lower wage countries to higher per capita/higher wage countries. That is why we observe that south-north migration is such an important component of overall international migration. Development indicators such as per capita income, real wages, level of institutional development, access to education, health and transport facilities, a safer environment, social peace and safe cities are, broadly, correlated among themselves.[iv] Another determinant of the flows of international migration is the difference in the phase of economic cycles among nations.
As a rule, immigrants will be attracted to countries enjoying economic prosperity, where they can find jobs and earn better salaries. Conversely, immigrants will avoid going to nations facing economic stagnation since jobs will be scarce and of poor quality. In turn, emigration will increase from countries where growth is weak and jobs are lacking.

Social networks (family, firms, acquaintances) play an important role in providing migrants with information, funds and contacts in the host countries regarding critical issues such as job opportunities, availability of housing, school for children, banking facilities and so on.

Migration also entail costs for the migrant and his family. There are costs of travel, settlement costs and the costs of job search. Other costs are of an emotional nature and are associated with leaving behind family members and friends following the decision of migrating to a foreign nation. Also there are psychological costs associated with adjusting to a new culture, work habits, rules, laws and institutions.

Migration is also regulated (or unregulated in the case of illegal migration) by immigration laws in the receiving country. Visas, work permits, rules for obtaining permanent residence and citizenship are all regulated by migration laws passed by national government.[v]There are also international conventions and covenants often promoted by the United Nations, the International Labor Office and the International

Organizations for Migration and signed by member countries that establish certain rights of international migrants.

There are also conventions for refugees and displaced population in situations of war and armed conflict. Some countries are more open to international migration while others are more restrictive and migration policies may favor inflows of people with financial and human capital. In contrast, mass migration composed by lower-skills workers and people with modest education must face much longer waiting periods when applying for visas and work permits in hosting nations.

The unit of destination is also relevant in the dynamics of international migration and people often migrate to specific cities rather than somewhat abstract nations. Sydney, Melbourne, London, New York, Paris, Vancouver and other cities are magnets for wealthy migrants, internationally mobile professionals and people tied to the cultural and sports sectors. Migrants often prefer living in vibrant cities with safe neighbors, good transportation systems, quality schools for their children, good health systems, a supply of cultural activities such as concerts, museums, art exhibitions and bookstores. Other factors such as the size of migrant communities coming from the same country or city of origin (network effects) in receiving countries also drive migration flows.

South-north economic migration is driven, largely, by the large income per capita and wage differentials existing between developed and developing countries. In south-south migration, income and wage gaps also matter but migration is also influenced by factors such as closer geographical proximity, cultural affinity and the existence of more open migration policies compared with those prevailing in high-income nations.

Types of Migration

So far we have carried out the discussion of the main determining factors in terms of a "representative" international migrant. However, in reality, there are differences in the type and characteristics of individual migrants according to their earnings and levels, skills, talents, education level, age, gender and motivations to migrate.

International Mobility of the Wealthy

Historically, individuals of high-wealth, including entrepreneurs and "rentiers", have moved internationally in response to opportunities for profit and business abroad or as part. The financial empire built by the Rothschild family in the 19th century required an important degree of international mobility of those at the helm of the family business.[vi] In turn, successful entrepreneurs such as Mellon, Vanderbilt, Carnegie and Rockefeller, Soros, were born abroad and migrated to the United States where their careers and fortunes (including philanthropic activities) received a big boost.[vii]

The wealthy often leave their home nations when anti-capitalist revolutions took place. That was the case of the Russian revolution of 1917 in which the Russian wealthy went to Europe to escape the Bolsheviks. The Chinese revolution of 1949 also led to Chinese economic elites to leave mainland China and settle in other parts of Asia where they became important engines of entrepreneurial activity. Then Cuban revolution of 1959 also prompted a massive exodus of the wealthy and upper middle class, chiefly to the United States.

Unlike the case of low-skill and poor migrants, the wealthy face no real financial constraints to afford the costs of moving, included the fees charged by relocation companies that look after legal, real estate, financial and other dimensions involved in the migration of the rich.[viii] It is estimated that, as of 2016, some 82,000 HNWIs relocate globally (Global Wealth Migration Review, 2017), preferring living in nations different from their birth-place (the total stock of migrants is near 250 million). Thus we are speaking of a very small group of individuals worldwide but with a large command of financial resources, U$ 69 trillion (2016) and growing (Fernandes, 2017). Wealth is extremely concentrated worldwide with less than 1 percent of the world population holding near 50 percent of total private wealth (Solimano, 2017).[ix]
The three most preferred country *destinations* for HNWIs in 2016 were Australia, the United States and Canada. In turn, main *origin* countries for the wealthy are France, India, China, Brazil, Turkey and others (*The Wealth Report*, 2017).

Table 5a. Three Preferred Country of Destinations for HNWIs (inflows, 2016).

Country of Destination	**HNWIs Inflows**
Australia	11,000
United States	10,000
Canada	8,000

Note: figures rounded to nearest 1000

*

Table 5b. Highest Net Outflows of HNWIs by Country
2016

Country	Net Outflows of HNWIs
France	10,000
China	9,000
Italy	6,000
India	4,000
Greece	3,000
Russia	2,000
Spain	2,000
Brazil	2,000

Source: Knight Frank (2017)

In terms of preferred cities of destination table 6 provides the following list;

[insert Table 6 here]

Table 6. Highest Inflows of HNWIs by City (2016)

City	Inflows of HNWIs
Sydney	4,000
Melbourne	3,000
Tel Aviv	2,000
Dubai	2,000
San Francisco	2,000
Vancouver	2,000
Seattle	1,000
Perth	1,000

Source: The Wealth Report 2016

Main city destinations for the wealthy in 2016 were Sydney, Melbourne and Perth, Tel Aviv, Dubai, San Francisco, Vancouver and others (table 4a). Traditional spots for the rich include also New York and London given the prime property market, cosmopolitan environments and their highly developed financial systems.

Motivations of HNWIs to choose the country of residence

Attitude surveys applied to wealthy individuals highlight the following list of factors the wealthy consider for choosing a country to establish a residence for them and their families:

(A) Personal safety.
(B) Availability of high-quality health services.
(C) Favorable tax treatment.
(D) Protection of wealth and property rights and good financial systems.
(E) Good education opportunities for the children.
(F) Visa-free mobility to third countries.
(G) Cosmopolitan settings and good transport connections.

Pulling factors to attract the very rich

In general, the rich will place a high to value personal safety, protection of wealth and respect for property rights, the existence of an effective financial system, good education facilities for their children, visa free mobility to third countries besides the other factors listed above. Increasingly there seems to be a "global market of nationalities" in which governments compete among them to attract a small elite of wealthy people who can bring with them fresh capital, market connections and invest in the local property market and equity markets.[x] The so called "investment migration regimes" allow governments to offer permanent residence, or even citizenship, in exchange for certain investment by prospective immigrants in real estate, government bonds, development funds, commercial bank accounts and productive firms (see Surak, 2017). In contrast, governments of high-income nations deploy lengthy reviewing processes for granting working visas and residence permits to unskilled migrants worker's migration, showing the asymmetric nature of existing migration regimes that have differentiated admission rules and in which having wealth provides a critical advantage for obtaining residence permits and citizenship.

The "Quality of Nationality Index, QNI" (H&P and Kochenov, 2016) ranks countries in terms of levels of economic and human development, peace and stability, visa-free access to third countries (freedom to travel), ability to work without permits and special visas (freedom of settlement) and quality of the legal system. Interestingly, the index gives a considerable weight to the fact that holding citizenship of high-income nations and the European Union enhances the ability to travel without restrictions to other nations.[xi]

For the wealthy, *security* in a broad sense, including both protection of wealth and individuals/families, is an overriding concern in choosing their location to live. At this point, a separation must be made between protection of assets and protection of people. Assets are often placed, by the rich, in special jurisdictions called "fiscal paradises" (e.g., Cayman Island, Virgin Island, British Virgin Island, Switzerland, Panama, Singapore, Jersey Island, Macao and others) that offer discretion/secrecy on the owners of bank accounts and property and establish low taxes (or no taxation at all) on yields of assets and other sources of income of foreign depositors.[xii] Also wealthy migrants will value countries with well-developed banking systems, currency and capital convertibility, adequate legal services, predictable policies and "capital-friendly" tax structures.

Pushing Factors for the Wealthy to leave their Home Nations

Why the super- rich seeks to leave their home country in which most of their wealth was made? The lack of adequate protection of property rights often is cited as a deterrent to remain in the country of origin. In general, economic insecurity, arbitrary and cumbersome taxation systems, political uncertainty, austerity policies, depressed asset prices, violence and terrorism are factors that induce the rich to leave their country of residence. Russia is a case of rapidly-made multi-millionaires after the end of the Soviet Union. When capitalism was restored a small group of well-connected people started to accumulate big wealth through insiders privatization (a sort of post-socialist "accumulation by dispossession").[xiii] As of 2016 there were in Russia around 2,500 people with investable assets above U$ 30 million (Ultra-High Net Worth Individuals, UHNWI). This number is, however, below the 14,000 in China and 69,000 in the United States (*The Wealth Report*, 2017). In Russia the income Gini coefficient (measuring inequality of income flows) went up (an increase in inequality) from near 25 percent in the mid 1980s (still the socialist period) to over 45 percent in 2012-14. In China, three decades of very rapid economic growth in the range of 8-10 percent per year in a regime of state-capitalism (headed by the communist party) created big wealth for individuals that could capture investment and profit opportunities (the jump in the income Gini in China in the last two to three decades has been comparable with that of Russia; Solimano, 2017).

In Latin America, modern inequality started with concentrated patterns of land ownership (including gold and silver deposits underneath) allotted by the Spanish crown to their delegates and local oligarchies of Spanish descent after conquest. More recently, land inequality was replaced by inequality in the holdings of financial assets and tradable natural resources such as copper, oil, thin, rubber and others. Current estimates of Gini coefficients for net personal wealth yield numbers in the range of 70-80 percent for some developing countries such as Chile and South Africa. Even more concentrated is financial wealth, with the Gini coefficient climbing, in these two countries, to 90 percent (Solimano, 2017). [xiv]

It is a well established that more unequal societies (e.g. Latin America countries) tend to be more unstable and prone to macroeconomic crises, and cycles of populism and authoritarianism than more socially cohesive and egalitarian societies (e.g Scandinavian and Central European nations).[xv] The very wealthy may gain or lose in settings of high inequality, crisis and instability. The gains may accrue from asset speculation (buying assets at fire-sale prices and then selling them at higher prices in the economic rebound). The losses may arise, however, if their productive activities (to the extent they are engaged in them) are affected by low demand and labor unrest. In turn, governments in socially polarized societies may choose to tax or expropriate/confiscate assets of the rich prompting them to seek safe heavens abroad.

Another factors that can trigger the flight of people and capital are violence, terrorist activity and taxes. France had the largest outflow of HNWIs in 2016 (table 5b), coinciding with the Paris terrorist attacks of late 2015 and the Nice's attack of July 14th, 2016. A similar situation can be attached to Turkey (also experiencing outflows of HNWIs) affected by terrorism and heightened Islamic fundamentalist activity.

Taxes can also stimulate the rich to leave home. In 2014 prominent French actor Gerald Depardieu was granted Russian nationality following his desire to stop paying what he considered high taxation in his home country. There is also a number of wealthy (as well as middle- class Americans), mostly living outside the U.S. and holding other nationalities, that have relinquished their American citizenship in recent years. Case studies highlight that a main motivation for doing so is not so much a very high *level* of taxation but the *complexity* of the US tax system, including the high cost of filing taxes every year outside the U.S. when tax experts conversant on that tax system are in rather short supply. Also concerns on the invasion of privacy on asset holdings by U.S. tax authorities is reported as another cause for that decision.[xvi] On the other hand, countries with a high level of personal taxation such as Scandinavian countries do not figure prominently among the nations in which rich nationals depart from their home countries in which the rich pay high taxes but receive, like in any other citizen in universal systems of provision, good quality education, health services and pensions provided by the state.

The International Mobility of Talent

The international mobility of talent --people with high skills, special knowledge and high-value abilities — across countries and cities around the world is an important component of the international migration process. The literature on the topic includes Johnson, (1964), Patinkin, (1968), Solimano, (2008), Boeri, Brucker, Docquier and Rapaport (2012). Some of the talented are also very wealthy (e.g financial experts, top soccer players, bestselling authors, famous singers, world class entertainers) but other such as scientists and scholars are in the upper-middle class segment. In a project devoted to study the international mobility of talent sponsored by the United Nations University and the World Institute of Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) a three-way typology of talent allocation within and across countries was developed (Solimano, 2008):

(i) talent engaged in directly productive activities (managers, engineers, skilled workers),
(ii) talent devoted to scientific, training and academic endeavors in the university sector (scholars, academics and international students), and
(iii) talent allocated to the health sector and the cultural sector (medical doctors and nurses, writers, painters, singers).

Two critical features of the international mobility of talent can be highlighted: (a) its modest size-large impact mark and (b) its geographical concentration in high-income OECD nations. Regarding size, near 25 million people (c.2010) can be classified as high-skill or talent migration, which represents around 10 percent of total international migration. This is an approximation as some very talented people may not enrol in formal university studies (e.g. some forms of entrepreneurial talent and people in the arts and cultural circuits).

The bulk of the direction of the international mobility of talent is north-north: executives of multinational corporations, financial experts, students, writers and cultural workers move from Europe to the U.S. and from the U.S. to Europe (besides the flows to and from Australia, New Zealand and Japan). However, there is also south-north talent mobility.

The outflow of human capital –brain drain-- from developing countries to rich nations has, historically, been a permanent source of concern as poor and middle income countries have invested in the education of their professionals that often leave home in search for better opportunities in advanced nations.

Global Circuits of Talent Mobility

The international mobility of talent can be conceptualized as a circuit, a market or a process. These concepts are not necessarily exclusive. We can identify five "circuits" in which global talent mobility takes place:

a) The international corporate sector chiefly comprised by multinational companies and international banks (CEOs, managers).
b) The independent private sector (professionals, experts, cultural workers).
c) The academic sector-universities (scholars, scientists, international students).
d) The international public sector (UN, World Bank, OECD, IMF, etc.).
e) The global civil social society (Foundations and NGOs).

Managers, financial experts and human resource specialists that belong to multinational corporations move across countries within the corporations through the modality of intra-company transfers (ICT). The main destination for ICT within the OECD is the United States followed by the UK and Canada.[xvii] In contrast, independent professionals (architects, medical doctors, etc.) move to other countries to pursue their careers without the protection of a multinational corporation. Service providers (e.g. in the IT and medical sectors, in construction, finance and other activities) are often hired by companies in the origin countries rather than in the country in which the service is rendered.

Universities and research centers in the north are increasingly employing foreign scholars and academics and appoint them as professors in prestigious universities of several high-income OECD nations is growing. The international tertiary sector provides a vehicle of migration for researchers, scholars and foreign students that decide to pursue their training and academic careers outside their country of origin. Also the international public sector composed by organizations such as the United Nations, the IMF, World Bank, the regional development banks, the OECD and other –whose headquarters are often located in the north— provide well-paid jobs along with other benefits for professionals and experts. Professionals from developing countries and emerging economies find these positions attractive and, therefore, pursue their careers in these organizations. A side effect, perhaps un-intendedly, is for these organizations to foster a degree of brain drain of professionals from developing countries.[xviii] In addition, there is a plethora of international NGOs and the foundations sector, sometimes called "global civil society." To cite some: Ford Foundation, Soros Foundation, the Gates Foundation, the International Red Cross, Doctors without Frontiers and several others. These organizations provide employment opportunities to professionals, volunteers, international students from the south although often offering less generous packages than those offered by international financial institutions. Finally, a growing modality of international temporary employment is the *working holiday program* system, which is oriented to the youth. This program and concomitant visa system are valid for one to two years and have been implemented, mainly, in Australia (the main recipient in the OECD area) along with Canada, New Zealand and other countries.

Another important modality of mobility of qualified human resources is composed by foreign *medical doctors and nurses*. As of 2011, near 22 percent of total medical doctors in OECD countries were foreigners and 14.5 percent of the nurses came from non-OECD countries. According to the Wealth Health Organization (WHO), that percentage was 9 percent in 2000/2001.

Economists often stress the mechanism of supply and demand in the allocation of resources both at national and international levels. The market mechanism, in turn, overlaps with the international circuits of talent mobility just sketched and can offer some clues on the patterns of south-north talent mobility. As already said, the *demand for talent*, coming from the private, academic, public and non-for profit sectors, is predominantly located in the global north as the headquarters of multinational corporations, international organizations, the best universities and international foundations are located mainly in the United States and Europe. In turn, the *supply of talent* is increasingly coming from countries such as India, China, Taiwan, Russia, Argentina, Chile, Brazil and other nations. There is a constellation of factors that attract talent in the north such as as higher pay structures, more resources for research in universities, a greater critical mass with whom talent can interact with in their creative processes. In addition, countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and others offer special visas to foreigners that bring capital, special skills and outstanding abilities. This may take the form of a point system in which applicants are sorted out by their academic degrees, jobs experience, language and other attributes deemed useful by the host countries.

Developing countries also need to retain local talent and/or attract foreign talent. Complementary to using visa mechanisms to engage foreign talent, a very relevant option is the mobilization of migrant diasporas in which communities of nationals living abroad have accumulated savings, new skills, productive experience, academic and commercial contacts that can be mobilized for national development of the origin countries through an active policy of engagement and attraction of these professionals led by governments of the origin countries. Such initiatives already exist in several countries but they can be boosted and improved (Solimano, 2012).

Talent Migration and Capital Mobility

Another important subject is the relationship between the international mobility of talent and the mobility of capital. Does capital chases talent? or rather talent chases capital? These are important questions from the viewpoint of the geography of international development. We may think of Microsoft deciding setting operations in Bangalore, India, to make productive use of local talent, that is cheaper (and of good quality) than in the US and Europe or, alternatively, choosing to hire Indian IT experts to come and work in Seattle. In the first case capital (Microsoft) goes to where talent is located (India) while in the second case talent goes to where capital is located. This would be a choice to be done at microeconomic level.

The international and historical evidence at country level on which modality of factor mobility prevails offers a mixed story, one that evolves over time. The United States since the 19th century received large numbers of migrants from Europe, Asia and other parts of the world. That immigration of people with different skills, education levels and attitudes to risk-taking helped to colonize western lands, set-up farms and new factories, energizing the American economy. Immigration of entrepreneurial talent and workers engaged in production and finance boosted the mobilization of savings, investment and growth, contributing to the U.S. to achieve its status of the leading world economic power during the 20th century.

In macroeconomic terms, the US, after being a net exporter of capital (domestic savings exceeding investment) for most of the 20th century, became, in the 1980s a net importer of foreign savings and capital, running persistent current account deficits (domestic savings lower than investment) in its balance of payments with the rest of the world. Connecting with the American position regarding immigration, we can identify two regimes of factor mobility in the time span running from the late 19th century to the early 21st century: (i) one regime, roughly up to the 1980s in which the US economy was both an *importer* of labor (and entrepreneurial capacities), and a *net exporter* of capital and then (ii) a second regime since the 1980s in which the U.S. becomes, simultaneously, *a net importer* of capital, talent and workers, to support domestic spending and the expansion of internal productive capacities.

Another case, in the developing world, is Argentina. This country was one of the leading top five to six economies in the world up to the 1930s but then started to lag, relative to other nations, in economic performance. Nevertheless, it is still a nation with fertile and abundant land, educated population and a respectable industrial base. Argentina also experienced changes in its regimes of international factor mobility but these shifts were more severe and frequent than in the United States. In the late 19th century and early 20th century the country *imported both* financial capital (mainly from England, Germany and France) and human capital (entrepreneurs, technicians and workers, mostly, from Italy and Spain) a process that continued until the 1950s. However, in following decades, due to a combination of economic decay, military coups and insecurity both people and capital started to leave Argentina. In some periods, though, the cycles of capital flight and emigration were followed by a return of capital and talent in bouts of restored (but fragile) stability and expectations of prosperity. When those hopes were disappointed by reality, a new cycle of capital flight and emigration resumed.[xix]

History shows that good opportunities and perceived prosperity invite immigration and this reinforces a virtuous cycle of growth and dynamism. However, these positive dynamics may not last forever and the reverse of capital flight, emigration and deserted lands may prevail. In addition, mixed configurations of outflows of capital and inflows of talent and vice-versa are also possible depending on the macroeconomic balance between savings and investment and specific microeconomic conditions such as resource scarcities and incentives and the quality and openness of local institutions.

Development Implications of Talent Mobility for Sending Nations.

The appreciation of the costs and benefits of the international mobility of talent and human capital has varied over time. In the 1960s and 1970s the emphasis was on brain drain considerations when analysing the mobility of highly educated people away from their home countries, see the controversy between the "internationalists" represented by Harry Johnson, (Johnson, 1964) and the "nationalists" in Don Patinkin, (Patinkin, 1968). Later on, a more nuanced evaluation of the effects of human capital mobility, emerged (Schiff, 2005 and Solimano, 2010). New effects were highlighted: although the emigration of professional and technical personnel may entail, initially, a brain drain cost for the origin country, this effect may be compensated, at least partially, by the inflow of remittances, access to new knowledge generated abroad and by the contacts these professionals develop outside their home country. Also the rate of return of education goes- up as human capital becomes more scarce after emigration, inviting, over time, more people to educate in the home country. Likewise, the outflow of scientists, university professors, and scholars can be costly for the sending nation affecting learning and research. However, if the academics and scientists remain connected with their home country through teaching and joint research initiatives, these effects can again be smoothed, although may not disappear altogether.

The flight of entrepreneurs may reduce the rate of creation of new firms, the undertaking of new investments, curtailing also job creation and technology applications in the home country. However, these effects can be ameliorated if national entrepreneurs remain engaged with their home country through investment, open access to new external markets and do mentoring activities to young entrepreneurs and innovators.

Other types of talent mobility can be more complicated. The persistent emigration of medical doctors, nurses, and other health-care workers from the Caribbean, from nations in Sub-Saharan African, the Philippines, and other developing countries is more problematic. In fact, these outflows can severely strain the health sector in low to middle-income origin countries affected by AIDS epidemics, malaria, and other diseases, particularly in low income nations. Some receiving (developed) countries have reacted to this reality by putting "negative lists" of health professionals coming from certain developing countries that they do not want to encourage their medical doctors and nurses to leave. Of course, the cost of these reactions fall on these very professionals that are prevented to work in certain destination nations that offer attractive professional opportunities for them. Other possibility is for receiving countries to donate hospitals and finance fellowship to health workers in the developing world to mitigate some of the costs of the outflow of professionals in the health sector.

Migration, Macroeconomic Crises and Inequality

Economic and financial crises --and their aftermath-- can affect migration flows through three main channels: (a) reducing aggregate economic growth, employment and real wages in receiving countries, reducing the incentives for immigration; (b) rising return migration to the origin country and (c) a slowdown in the level of remittances that migrants send back home. Stagnation traps, say protracted periods of low growth such as the decade after the crisis of 2008-09, tend to reinforce these trends.

Since the 1980s the global economy has suffered a sharp increase in the number of macroeconomic and financial crises in both developing and developed countries. This was the case of the debt crises in Latin America, Turkey and the Philippines in the 1980s, the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian crisis of 1998, the Argentinean crisis of 2001-02 and the global financial crisis of 2008-09 originated in the United States and spread-out to Europe. Part of the adjustment to these crises situations in developing countries was through increased emigration. In turn, crisis in rich nations discouraged immigration flows and increased return migration. Also remittances to the home country tend to slowdown when there is a worsening in employment opportunities for migrants.

The composition of migration between less-skilled migration and talent migration is also relevant. Less skilled migrants tend to go to the construction sector of recipient countries, restaurant, home services, gardening and cleaning activities. In turn, high skills, educated migrants are often directed to managerial and professional positions in corporations and banks, the tertiary education, the health sector, IT activities and to creative industries. The period of stagnant growth in OECD recipient countries have affected differentially various economic sectors in the US and Europe. The construction sector has been hit hard in “austerity countries” such as Spain, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, therefore it becomes less an attraction pole for less skilled foreign migrants that use to work in construction. Similar trends have been observed in the US and the UK although with less severity than in Greece, Portugal and Spain.

It seems that stagnation traps and financial fragility, however unpleasant and costly, they do not seem to have paralyzed the incessant process of innovation and new product development that is at the heart of the capitalist production process. This has obvious implications for the immigration of talent into the IT sector, higher education and knowledge-intensive activities that keep attracting a variety of foreign talent spanning from software developers, technical staff, scholars, international students, financial experts and so on. This trend of talent migration is probably bound to continue in the future and even accelerate as in the case of international students, medical doctors and nurses and IT experts. The rate of immigration of medical doctors coming from India, nurses from the Philippines, and health professionals from the developing world going to OECD countries increased at a fast pace in the last 10-15 years (since the early 2000s) and show no signs of slowing-down in the years to come. This movement of health professionals contributes to reduce human resource shortages of the health sector in the global north (strong poles of attraction are hospitals and clinics the US and the UK). Moreover, it also leads to economic and professional gains to the foreign health professionals that migrate. The other side of the coin is, however, that these flows tend to aggravate shortages of health professionals in origin countries.

In the medium run, economic migration will largely depend on the gaps in *levels* of per capita income and wages and the differences in growth rates between the global north and the global south. As it can be expected due to convergence mechanisms and catch-up factors GDP growth in the global south tends to be higher than in the mature economies of the north. These differences intensified further between 2007 and 2013 when the north was in the stagnation trap following the 2008-09 crisis. However, since 2013, the growth gap between developing and developed countries has narrowed as the stimulus from high commodity prices coming from China started to vanish in main natural resource exporting nations.

Regarding the remittances channel, as table 7 below shows, the rate of growth of remittances fell in 2008-2010 to recuperate in 2010-2012 declining again in 2013-2015 (in levels, remittances increased from an average of U$ 327 million in 2008-2010 to U$ 431.3 million in 2013-2015). The decline in the growth of remittances sent by immigrants in the 2008-10 period was a consequence of the crisis of those years that affected the core capitalist economies of the north that were main receiving nations of immigrants from the south.

An additional effect of the 2008-09 crisis is the *outflow of professionals* from advanced countries to southern destinations (north-south migration of professionals). A case at hand is outmigration of Spanish professionals[xx] heading to South American countries (Chile and Argentina have been two main recipient countries of migrants from Spain since around 2009). It is interesting to note that Spanish migration to South America slowed-down and return migration picked-up when the Spanish economy economy started to recover since 2015.

[insert Table 7 here]

Table 7. Remittances to the Developing countries, 2008-2015

Years	Rate of Change, %	Millions of USD
2008-2010	6.6	327.0
2010-2012	8.6	375.0
2013-2015	3.0	431.3

Source: Elaboration from World Bank data.

Inequality and Migration

An important theme is the link between inequality and migration. A relevant distinction is between inequality within countries (internal inequality) and inequality between countries (international inequality), see Milanovic, 2016. In general, immigration tends to amplify internal inequality in recipient countries between capital and labor by increasing the supply of labor and therefore moderating the growth of wages relative to profits and the returns on capital assets. Conversely, emigration by making labor and human capital more scarce in the home country, tends to increase real wages improving functional income distribution in sending nations. From a political-economy perspective, this may explain, in part, political hostility to immigration in countries that receive large flows of immigrants as they are perceived to reduce the wages of locals and take their jobs (the argument is disputable as many low-level jobs taken by immigrants are not wanted anymore by nationals).

Regarding inequality between countries, international migration can contribute to reduce differences in wages and per capita income across countries over time. Economic historians studying the "Atlantic economy" (Europe, the United States and Canada) have shown that in the era of mass migration (c.1870-1914) there was a process of wage convergence[xxi] between labor–abundant European countries (Ireland, Italy and others) where people were earning modest wages and labor-scarce, North American countries (the United States and Canada) where labor was in relative short supply and thus wages were higher. A similar process of convergence took place between countries of the "Old World" (Europe) and other economies of the "New World" such as Argentina and Australia. Massive migration at the turn of the 20th century between the old and new world encouraged wage convergence, narrowing international inequality. However, throughout the 20th century and the early 21st century migration flows became more restricted and wage convergence weakened. Still, some tendency towards wage equalization could take place in some specific segments of the international labor market, say for markets for professionals, experts in technologies of information and other forms of highly mobile talent (see Freeman, 2006). In any case, at global level, the persistent and large differences in per capita income levels and living standards between advanced economies and developing countries, including conflict-ridden nations, predict the incentives to migrate to high-income nations will remain in the future.

Forced Migration, Refugees and Humanitarian Crises

So far, we have focused on the analysis of economic migration. However, people move across countries not only due to wage differentials but also when is *forced* to leave their home countries for adverse circumstances such as persecution for political, religious and ethnic reasons, war, violence and human rights violations. At conceptual level, the distinction between "exit, voice and loyalty" developed decades ago by social scientist Albert Hirschman could help to distinguish between economic and forced migration.

At practical level, the United Nations, a global organization, plays an important role in dealing with humanitarian crises, refers to forced migration as "*Forcibly Displaced Population*" (FDP, UNHCR, 2016).[xxii] FDP includes both internally displaced population, IDP (which are forced displacements within countries) and externally displaced population (forced migration between countries). This last category includes, mainly, refugees and asylum seekers.[xxiii]

By the end of 2016, FDP reached 65.6 million people, an unprecedented level not seen since World War II. A breakdown of the FDP by components yield the following numbers:

(i) internally displaced population (40.3 million).

(ii) refugees (22.5 million), and

(iii) asylum seekers (2.8 million).

Near two-thirds of FDP was composed by internally displaced population followed by refugees and asylum-seekers.[xxiv]

The five main source countries for refugees are Syria (5.5 million), Afghanistan (2.5 million) and South Sudan (1.4 million) with the three countries combined accounting for 55 percent of total refugees worldwide by the end of 2016 (other source countries are Somalia, Sudan, Congo, Myanmar, Burundi). These countries have been affected by armed conflict, triggering large flows of forcibly displaced population. In turn, main hosting countries include Turkey (2.9 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), Lebanon (1.0 million), Iran (979.400), Uganda (950.400), Ethiopia (791.600). Germany was the only high-income country among the top 10 refugee-hosting nations, the other nine were developing countries, several of them very poor nations. By the end of 2016 the refugee population in Germany reached near 670,000 people.

The internally displaced population represents the largest proportion of people affected by forced displacements. As of 2016 main source -countries generating the largest IDP flows included Congo, Southern Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen (UNHCR, 2016). The main country affected by IDP is in South-America: Colombia, with 7.7 million registered IDP at the end of 2016, followed by Syria with 6.3 million. Other countries with large IDP populations are Iraq, Congo, Sudan, Nigeria, Yemen, South Sudan, Ukraine and Afghanistan. Regarding asylum-seekers, as of 2016, the largest recipient of new asylum applications was Germany composed, mainly, by applicants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, that account for near 70 percent of total asylum- applications. In turn, the United States was the second largest recipient of new asylum seekers in 2016, with roughly half of them coming from Mexico and Central

America. Other asylum seekers to the US include displaced people from China and Venezuela.[xxv]

Finally, statelessness remains, largely, an “invisible problem”. A person without nationality often cannot go to school, get a job, open a bank account or see a medical doctor. Stateless individuals leave on the margins of society and are particularly vulnerable to economic and geo-political shocks. Estimates by UNHCR of the total pool of stateless people is on the order of 10 million worldwide covering 75 countries that report statistics of stateless individuals of various degrees of accuracy.

Concluding thoughts

International migration is shaped by new forms of migration such as south-south flows, the growing importance of talent migration, the migration of the very wealthy, the impact of macroeconomic crisis and stagnation traps in receiving countries, the public perceptions on migration and the stances that elected governments take on this issue. The conceptual frameworks, adopted traditionally by economists, to understand migration focus, fundamentally, on long run development gaps and cross-country wage gaps and worker’s migration. These factors are certainly very important but we have to consider also the motivations of other forms of migration such as the wealthy and talent mobility may be different: the rich cares above all for protection of their wealth and their families. The migration of human capital may seek an enhancement of earnings by moving abroad but further disaggregation is needed on specific motivation of different kinds of talented individuals. Scientist and scholars for example place high value to work in an environment with adequate research funds and a degree of collegial interaction. In turn, people in the cultural sector seek recognition and broader stimulation for creative expression.

An important set of topics is understanding better the interactions between migration of high wealth-individuals and property rights, stability of policy rules, democracy and macroeconomic crisis. The connections between international talent mobility and these variables are also relevant. Another critical issue is the growing differentiation and segmentation between investment migration regimes (visas and citizenship rights exchanged for money contributions by wealthy immigrants) and the reality of lengthy waiting periods that working migrants often face in high-income receiving countries. In addition, irregular migration and the undocumented status of

many residing foreigners is also a reality that should no be neglected in the design of inclusive and humane migration policies.
The current constellation of economic and geo-political factors is particularly complex and rapidly evolving; besides, anti-migration and nationalist positions are being held by various governments of receiving countries with unpredictable consequences. These changes in attitudes towards immigration will make it difficult, in various countries, to accommodate immigration pressures stemming from large inequalities in the global economy and the growing problem of international refugees. The incentives to migrate to the global north will persist to the extent that development gaps between north and south remain large and migration policies do not turn too restrictive. In addition, the problem of refugees will continue to the extent armed conflicts in different countries persist.

Recent migration figures show that south-south migration is already starting to surpass south-north migration and that there are important differences in cross regional migration patterns. In Latin America and North America the dominant pattern of migration is extra-regional migration while in Asia and Europe the dominant pattern is intra-regional migration. Finally, humanitarian crises are becoming a central focus of attention in a world affected by an increased frequency and severity of armed conflict, terrorism and violence in specific areas such as North Africa, the Middle East and other places. The number of refugees has skyrocketed in the last few years reaching levels unseen since World War II. The ability and willingness of advanced economies along with other recipient nations such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran to absorb very large flows of refugees and provide them stable jobs and facilitate their civic and cultural integration to the host nation is a main challenge. The shift in attitudes against accepting refugees is a main challenge for the endurance of the values of international solidarity, respect for international human, economic and social rights and more inclusive and peaceful development.

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Notes

[i] Main statistical sources of data on international migrants include population census, population registers, and nationally-representative household surveys.

[ii] Note that migration stocks in developed countries and developing countries include migrants from both regions and from outside these regions. Therefore, they do not correspond exactly to the concepts of south-north and south-south, north- south migration.

[iii] UN-DESA (2014), Table 2.

[iv] Migration flows are affected by development factors and at the same migration affect development (mutual causality) through effects on wage levels, investment, savings and productivity in sending and receiving countries.

[v] Visas and passports were virtually absent until the 1920s (see Solimano, 2010).
[vi] For an interesting biography of the Rothschild family and their times, see Ferguson (1999).
[vii] Solimano (2010).
[viii] In the case of poor migrants, the main components of migration costs are tickets for international travel, the cost of job search in a foreign country and settling costs.
[ix] Four large economies (the US, Germany, Japan and China) comprise near 60 percent of HNWIs worldwide.
[x] For analysis of power elites see C. Wright-Mills (1956), for the sociology of elites Pareto (1999). A more recent discussion of the origins and impacts of economic elites is provided in Solimano (2014).
[xi] This may be particularly valued by international investors who are nationals from certain countries that seek to travel to nations where entry-visas may be hard to obtain.
[xii] Zucman (2013) offers detailed estimated of "hidden wealth" in fiscal paradises around the world.
[xiii] The term "accumulation by dispossession" was elaborated by social scientist David Harvey in its analysis of privatization, transformation of commons, public goods and communal goods in private property during neoliberal capitalism, see Harvey (2005).
[xiv] The world average Gini coefficient for income is around 40 percent and for wealth Gini is near 70 percent.
[xv] See Easterly, 2001 for cross-country econometric evidence on this.
[xvi] Durden, T.(2014).
[xvii] Between 2007 and 2014, total ICT destinations in the OECD have grown by 25 percent (OECD, 2015).
[xviii] Of course, for the origin countries to retain their valuable professionals they must offer them attractive career opportunities and not just blame international organizations for the fact that professionals leave their home countries.
[xix] Solimano (2003).
[xx] The outflow of professionals also has been present in Greece, Italy and other austerity economies.
[xxi] It is estimated that around 70 percent of the wage convergence among countries of the Atlantic Economy was due to international migration from Europe to North America between 1870 and 1900 (see Hatton and Williamson, 1994, O'Rourke and Williamson, 2000 and Solimano, 2010).
[xxii] The main UN agency in charge of humanitarian assistance is UNHCR, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
[xxiii] Three additional categories are returned refugees, returned IDPs and stateless population (people who, according to international law, do not possess nationality of any country), for further details see Annex, UNHCR, 2016.
[xxiv] In the last two decades, there has been a steady increase in the number of FDP (in 1997 the number of FDP was 34 million). A main surge in FDP takes place in 2012 largely associated with the Syrian conflict.

[xxv] Important recipients of asylum applications besides Germany and the United States were Italy, Turkey, France, Greece, Austria, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Russia, South Africa and Sweden.